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RECENT CASES

ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE-WRONGFUL
SETTLEMENT BY THE INSURED'S AND
INSURER'S JOINT DEFENSE ATTORNEY
Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom1
On February 4, 1972, a complaint was filed by plaintiff-Quilico against
his physician, Dr. James D. Rogers, alleging negligence in the care and
treatment given to Quilico by defendant-Rogers. Dr. Rogers' insurance
carrier, Employer's Fire Insurance Company, retained the law firm of
Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom (Robson), to represent Dr.
Rogers in the Quilico medical malpractice action. While suit was pending,
Dr. Rogers informed the law firm that he would not consent to any offer
of settlement. Nevertheless, pursuant to a clause in the insurance contract
which granted the insurance company the authority to settle without the
consent of the insured,2 Robson settled the Quilico medical malpractice
action out of court for $1,250. Not only was the consent of Dr. Rogers
never obtained, 3 he was not informed of the settlement offer prior to
settlement.
Dr. Rogers filed suit in 1977 alleging that Robson had wrongfully
settled the Quilico action. The circuit court granted summary judgment
to Robson, but the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and found Robson
liable to Dr. Rogers on the basis of ethical obligations, independent of any
contractual obligation. The decision of the court of appeals was sum4
marily affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.

1980).

1. 74 f11. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1565 (1979), aff'd, No. 52548 (IlL.June 20,

2. The insurance policy required consent of the insured for settlement, unless
the policy had been terminated at the time of settlement. Dr. Rogers' policy had
been terminated prior to settlement of the Quilico action and therefore the insurer
had the power to settle without written consent of the insured. The court did
not find the settlement clause to be contrary to public policy. Id. at 471, 392
N.E.2d at 1370.
3. The dissent believed that Dr. Rogers implicitly had consented to settlement in a letter to the defendant which read: "I refuse to participate any further
with Mr. Quilico's absurd accusations .... I trust you can dispose of this problem quickly and with little difficulty." Id. at 478, 392 N.E.2d at 1374 (Alloy, J.,
dissenting).
4. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &cBelom, No. 52548 (Ill.
June 20, 1980). The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was short and failed
to address any issue in detail. In essence, the court incorporated by reference the
decision of the court of appeals. The basis of the affirmance was that "[t]he
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The relationship between attorney, insurer, and insured has been
characterized as a tripartite relationship. 5 The insurance defense attorney
has two clients, the insurer and the insured, with corresponding obligations
to each. Although the attorney is employed by the insurance company, he
is hired to defend an action against the insured. While the attorney may,
in many situations, adequately represent both interests concurrently, conflicting interests between the insured and insurer often arise.6 When this
occurs, the attorney will be unable to exercise independent judgment for
either client and therefore will be unable to comply with the standard of
professional conduct set forth in *Canon 5 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, unless he ceases to represent at least one of the parties or
each consents to the dual representation. 7 While this failure to comply with
the minimum standards of conduct established by the Code is an ethical
problem and not one of tort law, these standards are a relevant consideration in an attorney malpractice action.8
When a conflict of interest between clients arises, the attorney is faced
with serious ethical problems. The Code provides two options: withdraw
from the representation of one or both parties, 9 or, "if it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure [by the attorney] of the possible
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each,"' 0 the attorney may continue to represent
record does not show that there is no genuine issue of fact" and therefore was
not a proper case for summary judgment. Id., slip op. at 3. Since the Illinois
Supreme Court failed to adequately ventilate the issues, this article is a discussion
of the opinion written by the Illinois Court of Appeals.
5. 74 Il. App. 3d at 472, 392 N.E.2d at 1370. See also American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 590, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 570 (1974);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 198-99, 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976);
Mallen, Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line Between Professional Responsibility
and Malpractice, 45 INs. COUNSEL J. 244, 244 (1978).
6. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, EC 5-17; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS &
LIABILITY INSuRER, GUIDING PRINCIPLES (1969). Situations giving rise to a conflict
of interest include coverage disputes, collusion by the insured, settlement of claims
when the offer is within policy limits but the potential liability exceeds the policy
limits, and subrogation rights. See Mallen, supra note 5. See, e.g., Helm v. InterInsurance Exch., 354 Mo. 935, 192 S.W.2d 417 (En Banc 1946) (conflict of interest
arose as to whether the insured was covered under the policy).
7. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, Canon 5 states: "A lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client."
8. 74 IlL. App. 3d at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371. The Code has been used to
set a standard of conduct for a negligence action. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 415 (1968); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 526, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1966); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 301-02, 327 A.2d 891, 904 (1974). At least one leading
authority advocates that violation of the Code in a malpractice action should
have the same per se effect that violation of a criminal statute has in a negligence
action. Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a Measure of Attorney
Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. R kv. 281, 286-87 (1979).
9. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, DR 5-105(B).
10. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added).
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both. Under either option, if the attorney continues to represent the insured, the attorney owes the insured the same professional obligations that
would exist had the attorney been personally retained by the insured. 1
One of the obligations resulting from this attorney-client relationship requires the attorney to inform the client of any progress in the case or controversy. This obligation dearly includes a duty to inform the insured of
any settlement offers that may affect him.I2
The majority in the Rogers attorney malpractice action found that
when Robson became aware that settlement was imminent, knowing that
the insurance company desired to settle, even though Dr. Rogers had expressed an unwillingness to cooperate in such a result, a conflict of interest arose which made it improper for Robson to continue to represent
both clients without full disclosure.' 8 By continuing to represent the insured and the insurer without disclosure, Robson breached its ethical obligations to Dr. Rogers. The court concluded that under these circumstances,
Robson could be liable to Dr. Rogers for any loss suffered because of its
failure to disclose. 14 The rationale supporting such a conclusion is that the
failure to inform Dr. Rogers of the proposed settlement foreclosed any
alternatives otherwise available to him. He could have consented to continued representation by Robson at the expense of the insurance company,
with the likelihood that the case would be settled without his consent
pursuant to the insurance policy. On the other hand, he could have released the insurance company from its obligations under the policy and
defended the suit using his own attorney, bearing the risk of an adverse
judgment.'6 As a result of the failure of Robson to inform Dr. Rogers of
these two alternatives, Dr. Rogers suffered alleged damages consisting of
deprivation of an opportunity to pursue successfully a malicious prosecution action against Quilico for bringing the medical malpractice action;
11, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 472, 392 N.E.2d at 1371. See Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins.
Co., 156. Cal. App. 2d 652, 659, 320 P.2d 140, 145 (1958) (court found attorney
owes a high duty of care to both insured and insurer); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller,
17 Il. App. 2d 44, 52, 149 N.E.2d 482, 486 (1958) (attorney bound to same
high standards to insured, whether or not privately retained). In Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976), and American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 592, 113 Cal. Rptr.
561, 572 (1974), the loyalty to the insured was deemed paramount.
12. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 151, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416
(1968); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140,
148 (1958); Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 N.J. Super. 96, 102, 296 A.2d 96,
99-100 (Morris County Ct. 1972), aff'd, 130 N.J. Super. 48, 324 A.2d 906 (App.
Div. 1974); Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Wash. App. 180, 185,
511 P.2d 1020, 1024 (1973), aff'd, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d 193 (1974). But see
Waters v. American Gas Co., 261 Ala. 252, 261, 73 So. 2d 524, 532 (1953) (court
suggested that the duty of communication was only to the insurer).
13. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 392 N.E.2d at 1372. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR
5-105; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND LIABILITY INsURERS, GUIDING PRIN-

cxiPLEs Principle V (1969).
14. 74 IIl. App. 3d at 475, 392 N.E.2d at 1372. See also Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 153, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 417 (1968).
15. 71 l. App. 3d at 475, 392 N.E.2d at 1372.
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loss of direct and referred surgical patients, and increased professional liability insurance premiums resulting from the medical malpractice action;
and additional legal fees in pursuing the attorney malpractice claim.16 The
court found these allegations to be sufficient to state a cause of action and
remanded the attorney malpractice case so the jury could resolve the
questions of proximate cause and damages.17
The issue of proximate cause was the point upon which Justice Alloy,
of the court of appeals, dissented;' 8 he believed there could be no causation as a matter of law. Though in total agreement as to Robson's obligations to Dr. Rogers resulting from the attorney-client relationship, Justice
Alloy concluded that the breach of these obligations was not the "proximate cause" of Dr. Rogers' damages for two reasons. First, Dr. Rogers was
not deprived of any rights or benefits under his insurance contract since
the insurance company had the right to settle without his consent.' 9 Second,
the damages alleged were too speculative. Justice Alloy argued that Dr.
Rogers would have had to prevail in the Quilico medical malpractice action and in a subsequent malicious prosecution action against Quilico
before a loss could be established. Justice Alloy reasoned that
[t]he conclusion of the attorneys for Dr. Rogers that this was in
his best interest should not be lightly overridden and subject such
attorneys to a malpractice action against them based on no sound
allegation of damage. To do so would invite speculative action
on the part of any individual who has expressed a desire that
his particular action not be disposed of, even though in the best
interests of the client.2 0
The Rogers attorney malpractice action presents the difficult problem resulting from the conflict of interest inherent in the insurance tripartite relationship. The conflict arose in an unusual context in Rogers
since most professional liability insurance contracts require the consent of
the insured for a settlement. 2 ' Nevertheless, the Rogers decision has possible implications of a broad nature in the insurance industry. For example,
settlements in automobile accident cases are commonly handled in a
manner similar to that in the Quilico medical malpractice action. While

16. In Berlin v. Nathan, No. 75-M2-542 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 1, 1976), punitive
damages were granted on a malicious prosecution suit. This decision, however,
was reversed by the Illinois Court of Appeals in Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d
940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978).
17. The majority did not review the sufficiency of the damages since it believed that the sufficiency was not specifically contested. The dissent did address
the problem of damages. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
18. 74 Il1. App. 3d at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
19. The Illinois Supreme Court specifically refused to address the issue of
whether the insurance company could settle the action without Rogers' consent.
No. 52548, slip op. at 3.
20. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 1375 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 135, 156
Cal. Rptr. 360, 367 (1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/8
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the possible damages to the insured for wrongful settlement may not be as
apparent or as substantial in the automobile accident situation, they definitely are present. 22 A fortiori, a wrongful settlement in this context could
precipitate civil liability on the part of the attorney as well as disciplinary
23
penalties.
The Rogers attorney malpractice case did not address the problem of
disciplinary measures in any detail; the case focused on the issue of
attorney malpractice. Because malpractice generally is considered to be a
negligence action2 4 the decision should be analyzed in that context. To
recover the plaintiff must prove: (1) a duty or obligation, recognized by
law, requiring the party to adhere to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
failure to conform to that standard; (3) damages; and (4) causation. 25
Inherent in any attorneyclient relationship is the obligation of the
attorney to act in his client's best interest. 26 An attorney is bound to conduct himself as a fiduciary; in all relations with his client, he is obligated
to exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity.27 As seen in the Quilico
medical malpractice action, insurance cases often create the added difficulty of multiple clients in the same litigation. Most insurance contracts
expressly empower the insurer to select the attorney of its choice to defend
the insured. 28 The attorney is then obligated to represent the interest of
both the insured and insurer. When a conflict arises between multiple
clients, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 provides that the attorney should either
terminate the multiple employment or disclose fully the conflict and obtain approval from each client before continuing representation. The insurance contract does not appear to vary these ethical obligations and
duties. 29 The courts consistently have stated that the defense counsel owes
the same unqualified loyalty to the insured as if he had been personally
retained by the insured. In fact, several courts have maintained that the
loyalty to the insured may even be paramount because the defense of the
22. An automobile accident may increase substantially insurance premiums.
In addition, the existence of a bad driving record may affect adversely the job
possibilities of truck drivers, bus drivers, and traveling salesmen.

23. See Calkins, Dilemmas in Professional Ethics: Counsel for Insurance Company and Insured May Face Conflicts Requiring Full Disclosure to Both Clients,
36 J. Mo. BAR 57 (1980).
24. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or"ToRTs 161 (4th ed. 1971).
25. Id. at 143. See also Nichols v. Blake, 418 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Mo. 1967);
7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 255 (1980); Comment, Attorney Liability for Unintentional Malpractice in Missouri, 39 Mo. L. Rlv. 400, 401 (1974).

26. Mo. Sur. CT. R. 4, EC 5-1 states: "The professional judgment of a lawyer
should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his

client and free of compromising influences and loyalties."
27. See In re Oliver, 365 Mo. 656, 665, 285 S.W.2d 648, 655 (En Banc 1956);
Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 694, 230 S.W.2d 731, 739 (En Banc 1950); Addison
v. Cope, 210 Mo. App. 569, 578, 243 S.W. 212, 214 (Spr. 1922). See generally
7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 234 (1980).
28. Mallen, supra note 5, at 245.

29. Moritz v. Medical Protection Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
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insured is the sole basis for the employment.3 0 Therefore, Robson had a
clear obligation to Dr. Rogers which, at a minimum, required full disclosure. Robson clearly failed to make such a disclosure even- though the
conflict of interest between the insured and insurer was readily apparent.
In an attorney malpractice action such as Rogers, the issue of damages
generally is left to the jury and the speculative nature of the damages
normally is not a ground for court directed dismissal of the action. Proof
of damages in an attorney malpractice case often is difficult, however, because the plaintiff must prove the value of the underlying claim, i.e., the
plaintiff must show that he was denied a favorable verdict for a claim he
was pursuing because of the attorney's negligence. 3 ' The underlying claim
in Rogers was the malicious prosecution action that Dr. Rogers alleged he
could have successfully brought against his former patient, Quilico, after
a successful defense to the Quilico medical malpractice case. The claim
was allegedly lost because the settlement in the medical malpractice action
by Robson prevented the presentation of a successful defense. It has been
noted that damages based on loss of a malicious prosecution action present a novel problem of proof for the plaintiff in the attorney malpractice action. 2 Dr. Rogers not only would have to show that he could have
obtained a favorable determination had the Quilico medical malpractice
action proceeded to verdict, but also would have to show that Quilico
brought the medical malpractice action absent probable cause, and that
the action was precipitated by malice on the part of Quilico and his attorney. Only by proving that he could have won the medical malpractice
action, and subsequently have won a malicious prosecution action against
Quilico, could Dr. Rogers show that he was damaged by the wrongful
settlement of Robson and thus recover in the attorney malpractice case.
Causation is a determination of whether there is some reasonable
connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage
which the plaintiff suffered. The issue of causation involves two questions:
(1) was there causation in fact; and, if so, (2) was there proximate cause? 8
4
Causation in fact is a question particularly well suited for the jury.
Whereas proximate cause is essentially a problem of law; "whether the
30. Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d
94, 98 (1976) (quoting with approval Blakslee, Conflict of Interests: Insurance
Cases, 55 A.B.A.J. 262, 263 (199) (paramount duty must be to the insured or it
would destroy the public's confidence in the legal profession)); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 590, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 570
(1974) (the attorney's primary obligation is to the insured in an action to prevent
disclosure of the attorney's working papers).
31. See generally Comment, supra note 25, at 403-04.
32. See Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821-22, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690
(1978); Freeman, Endless Litigation: Justice or Revenge?, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 238,
238 (1978).
33. W. PRossER, supra note 24, at 237. See also Branstetter v. Kunzler, 364
Mo. 1230, 1237, 274 S.W.2d 240, 245 (1955).
34. W. PRossER, supra note 24, at 237.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/8
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defendant should be [held] legally responsible for what he has caused...
[is] essentially a question of whether the policy of the law will extend the
responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred."35
The issue of proximate cause in the Rogers attorney malpractice action
centers on whether Robson should be held liable for settling without disclosure to Dr. Rogers, given the power of the insurer under the insurance
policy to settle. The majority found that the failure to disclose foreclosed
Dr. Rogers' opportunity to choose to litigate the medical malpractice action
to its natural conclusion and bear the risk of an adverse decision along
with the possibility of a favorable determination (which the majority believed could lead to a successful malicious prosecution suit against Quilico).386
1980]

The dissent took another approach, finding lack of proximate cause.
Although the dissent phrased its arguments in terms of the speculative
nature of the damages, the essence of the argument was that Robson's acts
had not caused any actual harm to Dr. Rogers. Causation and proximate
cause were lacking as a matter of law because the policy provided that the
insurance company could settle without the insured's consent. If the insurer had the power to settle the original action,3 7 no harm was caused
by Robson effecting the settlement, since Robson was acting in its capacity
as attorney for the insurance company when settlement was obtained. The
dissent concluded that settlement by Robson following a full disclosure to
Dr. Rogers would not have caused any different result. If Robson was
found liable but the insurance company was not, the insurer would be
encouraged to negotiate a settlement itself instead of hiring an attorney. In
other words, if the attorney were restrained but the insurer was not, the
insured's interest would still not be protected.
The immediate effect of the Rogers attorney malpractice decision on
the insurance industry would be fewer settlements. By this result, the decision tends to defeat societal interest in extrajudicial settlements by requiring much more than previously expected before the insurance com35. Id. at 244.
36. 74 III. App. 3d at 475, 392 N.E.2d at 1372.
37. The proposition that insurance companies may settle without the insured's consent, assuming the policy grants such a power, has been widely recognized by the courts. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hitchner, 61 N.J. Super. 283, 286,
160 A.2d 521, 522 (Law Div. 1960) (insured liable to insurer even though insurer
settled against insured's wishes); Wood Truck Leasing, Inc. v. American Auto.
Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (court upheld insurer's right
to settle without consent in the absence of fraud or bad faith, even though it caused
the insured to pay higher premiums). But see Employers' Surplus Line Ins. Co.
v. City of Baton Rouge, 362 So. 2d 561, 564-65 (La. 1978) (majority failed to hold
insured liable since the insured failed to consent; dissent pointed out the inconsistency of the majority in giving the insurer the duty to settle and to refuse to
settle). The right of the insurer to settle any claim is statutorily recognized in
Illinois by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95;, § 7-317(f)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1971).
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pany may effect a settlement.38 In essence, the decision at the least reads
more obligations into the insurer settlement clause, and at most reads the
clause out of the policy.
In addition to the unwelcome growth of unsettled cases, to effect the
result desired by the court-full disclosure to the insured and control by
the insured over the settlement process-Rogers may be extended to impose
new duties on insurance companies. 3 9 This expansion would create conflicting duties for the insurer. First, the insurer would be required to make
a reasonable settlement to protect the insured, a duty resulting from the
policy itself. Failure to fulfill the duty could cause the insurer to be liable
for any judgment in excess of the policy limit. Second, the obligation to
disclose would, in effect, give the insured total control over the decision to
settle.4 0 Therefore, the ultimate issue not decided in Rogers remains: does
the insured-client ultimately control the lawsuit?
The greatest risk inherent in the majority opinion is the risk of potential liability of the insured should he elect to litigate the action. The
potential liability could be devastating since the insured would be completely liable for the full amount of the judgment. The question arises:
is it the court's duty to protect the insured from himself? It appears that
an insured should be allowed to waive his coverage as to a particular action; he is the defendant in the case and not the insurance company.
When the case is analyzed as a basis for malpractice against an attorney for wrongful settlement, the equities do not support the finding of
proximate cause. Dr. Rogers received what he contracted for, an insurance
policy to protect against catastrophic financial loss which allowed settlement without his consent. The courts apparently have made a policy decision that the insurer should control the litigation of a suit as long as it
acts in good faith.41 In Rogers, a reasonable insurer probably would have
settled the case as Robson did.42 If the insurer would not be held liable in
tort, it seems inconsistent to hold the attorney liable in tort. This is not
a proposal that the attorney should not be held to a high standard of conduct; he should. But perhaps a malpractice action is not the proper forum;
a disciplinary proceeding may be more appropriate.
38. In Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 136, 156 Cal.

Rptr. 360, 367 (1979), the court stated that "[t]here is . . . a public interest in

extrajudicial settlement of lawsuits. The settlement clause tends to defeat that
interest and therefore will be narrowly construed ...

.

39. This is not possible in fllinois. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%, § 7-317(f)(3)
(Smith-Hurd 1971). It might be possible to limit the effect of the Illinois statute
through the use of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although the Code is
not enforceable against insurance companies, attorneys must abide by it. This might
encourage insurance companies to use nonattorneys to effect a settlement when
it could be handled more efficiently by an attorney.
40. See Employers Surplus Line Ins. Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 362 So. 2d
561, 565 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., dissenting); authorities cited note 37 supra.
41. See authorities cited note 37 supra.
42. The suit by Quilico was settled for $1,250. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 392
N.E.2d at 1368. Rogers never alleged that the settlement was unreasonable.
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